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Abstract. According to Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), high European unem-
ployment since the 1980s can be explained by a rise in economic turbulence, leading
to greater numbers of unemployed workers with obsolete skills. These workers refuse
new jobs due to high unemployment beneﬁts. In this paper we reassess the turbulence-
unemployment relationship using a matching model with endogenous job destruction.
In our model, higher turbulence reduces the incentives of employed workers to leave
their jobs. If turbulence has only a tiny eﬀect on the skills of workers experiencing
endogenous separation, then the results of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2004) are re-
versed, and higher turbulence leads to a reduction in unemployment. Thus, changes in
turbulence cannot provide an explanation for European unemployment that reconciles
the incentives of both unemployed and employed workers.
Key Words: Skill loss, European unemployment puzzle.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E24, J64.
∗den Haan: London Business School and CEPR. Haefke: Universitat Pompeu Fabra, CREA, and IZA.
Ramey: University of California, San Diego. The authors would like to thank Yann Algan, David Andolfatto,
Riccardo Colacito, Pietro Garibaldi, Marvin Goodfriend, Etienne Lehmann, Lars Ljungqvist, Christopher
Pissarides, Tom Sargent, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh and Gianluca Violante for useful comments.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 1
1. Introduction
Economists have oﬀered numerous explanations for the emergence of high European unem-
ployment in the 1980s, involving factors such as slow technological growth, weak capital
markets, regulatory barriers and overly generous welfare systems.1 One particularly inﬂuen-
tial explanation, suggested by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) (henceforth LS), is that rapidly
evolving industrial structure and technology, combined with high unemployment beneﬁts,
have reduced workers’ incentives to exit unemployment. Beginning in the 1980s, the higher
“turbulence” of the economic environment drove up the number of unemployed workers with
obsolete skills. High unemployment beneﬁts linked to prior high-wage jobs discouraged these
workers from accepting new jobs.
While LS provide a compelling rationale for decreased willingness of unemployed work-
ers to accept new jobs, their analysis overlooks an equally important response by employed
workers that cuts against their idea. Since displacement induces costly skill obsolescence
in a turbulent environment, workers ought to be much more reluctant to part with their
existing jobs, instead oﬀering wage concessions to avoid layoﬀs. Indeed, this intuition be-
came commonly-held among economic observers. Alan Greenspan, for example, oﬀered the
following clear statement in 1998:
“...the sense of increasing skill obsolescence has also led to an apparent willingness
o nt h ep a r to fe m p l o y e e st of o r g ow a g ea n db e n e ﬁt increases for increased job
security. Thus, despite the incredible tightness of labor markets, increases in
compensation per hour have continued to be relatively modest.”
1See Nickell (2003) for a review of research relating to the European unemployment question.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 2
Based on this argument, an increase in turbulence should have induced a reduction in the
rate of job destruction, exerting downward pressure on unemployment and working against
the job rejection channel highlighted by LS. But the model used by LS assumes that the
job destruction rate is an exogenous constant that cannot vary in response to economic
conditions. Thus, the robustness of the LS result to the enhancement of job retention
incentives remains an open question.
This paper reassesses the turbulence-unemployment relationship within a more complete
job-matching framework of the sort presented in Pissarides (2000). Drawing on the setup of
Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000), we develop a model in which workers’ skills increase
over time from low to high while they are employed at a given job, but may decline from high
to low when they are displaced, reﬂecting economic turbulence. The matching framework
oﬀers two important advantages relative to the search-based model considered by LS. First,
wage setting is determined by Nash bargaining between the worker and ﬁrm, so that the
worker is not forced to simply accept or reject the employer’s wage oﬀer. Second, in contrast
to LS, workers and ﬁrms can alter their wage and job retention decisions in response to
higher turbulence.
In response to our earlier paper (Den Haan, Haefke and Ramey (2001)), Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2004) (henceforth LS-II) proposed parameter values for our model that generated–
in the presence of endogenous job destruction–a positive relationship between turbulence
and unemployment. We use these parameter values as the benchmark parameterization to
establish an environment most favorable for the LS result. The parameterization speciﬁes a
positive exogenous separation rate that does not change as turbulence increases, along with
a positive probability that ﬁrms and workers choose to separate in response to unfavorable
match-speciﬁc productivity shocks. Importantly, the benchmark parameterization assumesTURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 3
that only exogenous separations lead to the possibility of skill loss following displacement.
The probability of skill loss after an exogenous separation serves to measure the degree
of turbulence. In contrast, the probability of skill loss following an endogenously-chosen
separation is zero under the benchmark parameterization.
In this setting, the original LS channel, associated with a decrease in the job accep-
tance rate, continues to operate. Moreover, higher turbulence reduces the overall net value
of employment relationships, so the job destruction rate actually rises.2 In this case, the
endogenous responses of worker-ﬁrm matches serve to reinforce the LS channel under the
benchmark parameterization.
It is clearly unreasonable, however, to assume that workers and ﬁrms place no weight
whatsoever on the possibility of skill obsolescence when making wage and job retention deci-
sions. Thus, we consider a perturbation of the benchmark parameterization that introduces
a positive but small probability of skill loss following an endogenous separation. Strikingly,
allowing for a skill loss probability following endogenous separation that is only 3% of the
probability following exogenous separation eliminates the positive turbulence-unemployment
relationship.3 Increasing this proportion to 5% gives rise to a strong negative relationship
between turbulence and unemployment. We conclude that the job rejection channel empha-
sized by LS is easily outweighed quantitatively by the rise in incentives to preserve jobs, even
when workers face only a tiny probability of skill loss following an endogenous separation.
In other words, the LS turbulence story does not hold up when the plausible responses of
2Thus, in contrast to the view expressed in the Greenspan quote, the increased possibility of skill loss
leads to an endogenous decrease in job security for the benchmark parameterization.
3That is, if the probability of skill loss after an exogenous severance is 10% and the probability of skill loss
after an endogenous severance is 0.3%, then the positive turbulence-unemployment relationship disappears.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 4
employed workers are taken into account.
Central to reversing the LS result is the eﬀect of turbulence on job destruction rates. We
show that perturbing the benchmark parameters has little eﬀect on the relationship between
turbulence, on one hand, and the number and job rejection rate of low-skilled unemployed
workers receiving high unemployment beneﬁts, on the other. Thus, the original LS channel is
unaﬀected by the perturbation. The relationship between turbulence and the job destruction
rate, however, is strongly reversed by the perturbation, causing unemployment to fall as
turbulence rises.
We consider an alternative explanation for the increase in European unemployment,
involving low discount factors. A decrease in the discount factor can represent either an
increase in the real interest rate or a decrease in disembodied technological growth, and
both have been shown in empirical work to be important in explaining changes in European
unemployment rates.4 We ﬁnd that the eﬀects are strongly magniﬁed in the presence of
turbulence because, as stressed by Ljungqvist and Sargent, low-skilled workers who formerly
were high-skilled have high job rejection rates. This exercise shows how the matching model
can in principle provide an empirically plausible account of the European experience.
Our model is presented in Section 2, and Section 3 analyzes the turbulence/unemployment
relationship for both the benchmark and perturbed parameterization. Section 4 considers
the eﬀect of reductions in the discount factor on the unemployment rate in the presence of
turbulence. Section 5 concludes. Some details of the equilibrium conditions are given in the
Appendix.
4See Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005), and Nunziata (2003).TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 5
2. Model
In this paper we analyze the turbulence-unemployment relationship within the job-matching
framework of Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000). This framework is similar to the
standard job-matching framework of Pissarides (2000), but allows workers’ skill level to vary
over time. In particular, we develop a model in which workers’ skills increase over time
from low to high while they are employed at a given job, but may decline from high to low
when they are displaced, reﬂecting economic turbulence. The model nests the original setup
used in Den Haan, Haefke, and Ramey (2001) to analyze the turbulence-unemployment
relationship, as well as the speciﬁcation used in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004).
2.1. Employment Relationships. Production takes place within employment relation-
ships consisting of one worker and one ﬁrm, who interact through discrete time until the
relationship is severed or the worker retires. Workers have either high skills or low skills,
indicated by subscripts h and l, respectively. The skill level of a given worker may vary over
time.
An employment relationship produces output z per period. When a relationship is ﬁrst
formed with a worker having skill level i, the initial value of z is drawn from the distribution
νi(z). Assume νh(z) <ν l(z), i.e., the high-skilled distribution ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates the low-skilled distribution. For a continuing relationship, the value of z may
vary as a consequence of relationship-speciﬁc productivity shocks that occur at the start of
a period. We consider three kinds of productivity shocks.
• With probability γs there is a switch of the productivity level z.I n t h i s c a s e , z is
drawn again from the distribution νi(z) for a worker with skill level i.I f n o s w i t c h
occurs, then the relationship maintains the previous period value of z.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 6
• With probability ρx the relationship experiences an exogenous separation shock, where
severance occurs automatically. Exogenous breakups reﬂect events that cause the
surplus to be negative under all circumstances. Assume that exogenous separations
cannot occur in the period that a relationship is newly formed.
• With probability γu, a relationship with a low-skilled worker obtains an upgrade of the
worker’s skills, wherein he receives a draw from the distribution νu(z) and becomes a
high-skilled worker if he does not leave the ﬁrm in the current period. As long as he
remains high-skilled, subsequent draws in any employment relationship involving this
w o r k e ra r em a d ef r o mt h ed i s t r i b u t i o nνh(z).5
After the current-period productivity parameter is determined, the worker and ﬁrm de-
cide whether to continue or sever their relationship, and, if the relationship is continued,
they determine the worker’s wage payment. Wages are set according to Nash bargaining,
where π gives the worker’s bargaining weight, and the disagreement point is severance of the
relationship. If the worker and ﬁrm agree to sever their relationship following a switch, or if
exogenous separation occurs, then they forgo production in the current period and instead
enter a matching market in which new employment relationships are formed.
To reﬂect turbulence in the economy, assume that high-skilled workers may lose their
skills when they become unemployed. Following an exogenous breakup shock, a high-skilled
worker suﬀers a downgrade of his skills, wherein he becomes low-skilled, with probability
γd,x. Alternatively, if the worker and ﬁrm choose to separate following a switch, then γd
5We will specify νu(z) to be a simple transformation of νh(z) in order to limit the number of worker
categories that must be considered in the analysis. See equation (6) below and the Appendix for details.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 7
gives the probability that the worker’s skills experience a downgrade.6 For a high-skilled
unemployed worker, assume that a downgrade also occurs with probability γd if, following
an e wm a t c h ,t h ew o r k e ra n dﬁrm choose not to begin a relationship after observing their
initial draw of z.T h i ss i m p l i ﬁes the model by making job acceptance and job continuation
decisions for high-skilled workers equivalent.
Finally, a worker retires (at the end of the period) with probability ρr, in which case he
leaves the labor market and obtains a future value of zero.
2.2. Matching Market. New employment relationships are formed on a matching mar-
ket. Each period, the number of newly formed relationships is m(u,v),w h e r eu i st h em a s so f
all unemployed workers (both low-skilled and high-skilled) and v is the mass of ﬁrms posting
vacancies. We assume that m(u,v) is homogeneous of degree one and that the total masses
of workers and ﬁrms are ﬁxed at unity. It follows that the unemployment and vacancy pools
will always be of equal size, and the matching probability for unemployed workers and ﬁrms
posting vacancies will be ﬁxed at the value λ = m(1,1).
Each period, a proportion ρr of the workers leaves the market through retirement, re-
placed by an identical number of new entrant workers who ﬂow into the unemployment pool.
These new entrant workers are assumed to have low skills. Further, established workers enter
the unemployment pool when their employment relationships are severed.
While unemployed, a worker obtains a per period beneﬁto fbj,w h e r ej is the skill level
the worker had in his previous job.7 Since equilibrium beneﬁt levels will satisfy bh >b l,a
6Note that Den Haan, Haefke, and Ramey (2001) set γd,x = γd > 0, while LS-II set γd =0 .
7The unemployment beneﬁto fn e we n t r a n tw o r k e r s ,be, is assumed to be zero, and these workers must
remain in an employment relationship for at least one period before they qualify for bl. Further, low-skilled
workers experiencing an upgrade must continue in their relationship for at least one period before theyTURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 8
key feature of the model with turbulence is that–as in LS and LS-II–there are low-skilled
unemployed workers with the high level of unemployment beneﬁts.
2.3. Zero Surplus Level. Newly-matched workers and ﬁrms choose to accept their
match and begin an employment relationship if their initial productivity draw z is suﬃciently
high. Correspondingly, a worker and ﬁrm in an ongoing relationship choose to continue their
relationship following a switch if the new draw of z is suﬃciently high. We assume that
the worker and ﬁrm bargain eﬃciently over the terms of their relationship, and thus they
make acceptance and continuation decisions that maximize their joint surplus,d e ﬁned as
follows. Let z denote the current period productivity parameter, and suppose the worker
obtains unemployment beneﬁt bj if the ﬁrm and the worker choose not to start or continue
a relationship. Then the joint surplus for a relationship with a low-skilled worker is given by
slj(z)=( 1− τ)z + gl(z) − bj − w
w
lj − w
f,j = e,l,h, (1)
where gl(z) denotes the future joint value from continuing the relationship, ww
lj denotes the
worker’s future value from entering the unemployment pool in the current period when he
receives an unemployment beneﬁto fbj, wf indicates the ﬁrm’s future value from entering
the vacancy pool in the current period, and τ is the tax rate on income earned in the
relationship.8 The surplus equation for a relationship with a worker who has received an
upgrade in the current period is given by




qualify for bh. Further details are given in the Appendix.
8There is a slight abuse of notation in that the tax rate is actually zero when z< 0. I nb o t ht h e
benchmark and the perturbed parameterization considered in Section 3, negative values of z do not occur.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 9
and the surplus equation for the remaining new and continuing relationships with high-skilled
w o r k e r si sg i v e nb y 9
shh(z)=( 1− τ)z + gh(z) − bh − γ
dw
w





In equilibrium, sij(z) is an increasing function of z and there exists a zero surplus level
zij indicating the smallest value of z at which accepting or continuing the relationship yields
nonzero surplus to the worker and ﬁrm. For values of z below zij,t h ew o r k e ra n dﬁrm will
either reject a new match, or they will sever an existing match. The zero surplus level is
deﬁned by the following condition:
sij(zij)=0 , (i,j) ∈ {(l,e),(l,l),(l,h),(h,l),(h,h)}. (4)
2.4. Equilibrium Future Values. The equilibrium future joint value from continuing
























9The surplus for a new relationship is equal to that for a continuing relationship because we make the
simplifying assumption that unemployed workers with high skills who turn down wage oﬀers are subject to
the same probability of skill loss as workers who separate from existing relationships.
10The discount factor, β, equals (1 − ρr)/(1 + ρ) and includes both the usual discount rate, ρ,a n dt h e
retirement probability, ρr.
11The max operator appears because sle(z) > 0 but sll(z) < 0 when zle <z<z ll. For these values of
z, entrants to the job market will accept the job and then return to the unemployment pool (with beneﬁts)
after one period, unless a switch or an upgrade makes it more attractive to stay in the relationship.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 10





0,z < z hh,
νh(z)/(1 − νh(zhh)),z ≥ zhh.
(6)
Since zhh >z hl,t h es p e c i ﬁcation of νu(z) implies that relationships experiencing an up-
grade will choose to continue with probability one. Thus, in equilibrium there will be no
unemployed high-skilled workers with low unemployment beneﬁts. Further, the equilibrium
































The future values from entering the unemployment pool, ww
lj and ww





















+(1 − λ)β(bh + w
w
hh),
For ﬁrms, the future value from entering the vacancy pool, wf, depends on the composition
of the unemployment pool. Let uij denote the mass of unemployed workers who have skill
level i and unemployment beneﬁt bj. The probability that a ﬁrm in the vacancy pool matches






, (i,j) ∈ {(l,e),(l,l),(l,h),(h,h)}. (10)TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 11











f,S = {(l,e),(l,l),(l,h),(h,h)}. (11)
2.5. Equilibrium Wage Payments and Unemployment Beneﬁts. T h ew a g ep a y -
ment to a worker having skill level i and unemployment beneﬁt bj, written pij(z), is deter-
mined by the Nash bargaining solution. For low-skilled workers the payment must satisfy
plj(z)+g
w
l (z)=πslj(z)+bj + w
w
lj,j = e,l,h, (12)
where gw






















































12Note that the matching probabilities λ and λ
f
ij relate to matches that are made in the current period,
and the joint surpluses sij(y) in equations (8), (9) and (11) derive from relationships that begin production























Equilibrium wage levels are used to calculate unemployment beneﬁts, bl and bh.13 In
particular, we assume that unemployment beneﬁts for workers with skill level j in their
previous jobs are equal to a fraction φ of a weighted average of wages earned by all workers
with skill level j. Details are given in the Appendix.
2.6. Worker Groups and Tax Rate. In equilibrium, the population of workers is di-
vided into groups according to their employment status, skills and the level of unemployment
beneﬁts for which they qualify. The Appendix gives a more detailed breakdown of the worker
groups, along with steady state conditions for each group.
Further, we assume that unemployment beneﬁts are the only government expenditures,
and that tax revenues are used to ﬁnance these beneﬁts. In equilibrium, the tax rate τ
adjusts to equate total unemployment beneﬁtp a y m e n t st ot o t a lt a xr e c e i p t s .T h eA p p e n d i x
provides expressions for beneﬁt payments and tax revenues that are used to calculate the
equilibrium tax rate.
3. Turbulence and Unemployment
Our principle objective is to analyze the relationship between the degree of turbulence, as
measured by γd and γd,x, and the equilibrium steady-state unemployment rate, given by
the sum of ule, ull, ulh,a n duhh. In Section 3.1 we use the parameter values of LS-II that
13Recall that be is assumed to be zero.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 13
produce a positive relationship between turbulence and unemployment under the assumption
γd =0 . In Section 3.2 we demonstrate the nonrobustness of this positive relationship
to a perturbation that raises γd slightly. In Section 3.3 we discuss whether interpreting
separations as quits versus layoﬀs imposes plausible restrictions on γd.
3.1. Results for LS-II Parameter Values. The benchmark parameterization, given
in the column I of Table 1, is taken from Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), who developed it
to match evidence on wage-experience proﬁles.14 The
. is one quarter. Since γd is set to zero under the benchmark parameterization, high-
skilled workers never face the prospect of skill loss following an endogenous separation.
Table 2 reports unemployment and job destruction results for various levels of γd,x.
Panel A shows that as the skill loss probability increases from zero to 100%, the aggregate
unemployment rate rises from 9.9% to 12.7%. The intuition for this result follows LS:
when γd,x has a high value, there are many unemployed low-skilled workers who had high
skills in their previous jobs. These workers receive unemployment beneﬁts that are high in
comparison to the wage oﬀers that their currently low skills can generate. Consequently,
their rejection rates are very high. For example, when the probability of skill loss equals
10%, a low-skilled worker entitled to high unemployment beneﬁts rejects 44.3% of all job
oﬀers.
Panel B shows how endogenous job destruction responds as turbulence increases. En-
14In our earlier paper (den Haan, Haefke and Ramey (2001)), we used a parameterization that implied
an unrealistically narrow range of lifetime earnings, with earnings rising too rapidly within this range.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) analyzed an alternative parameterization of our model, with a smaller value
of γu and a larger gap between the mean values of z for the high- and low-skilled productivity distributions.
In the present paper we make use of their parameterization as a benchmark.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 14
dogenous destruction rates, conditional on receiving a switch, for relationships with high-
and low-skilled workers are given by νh(zhh) and νl(zll), respectively. Note that these de-
struction rates both rise with γd,x. Two factors are important in explaining this result. First,
higher unemployment raises total unemployment beneﬁt payments, necessitating a higher
tax rate. This makes employment relationships relatively less attractive for both skill levels.
Second, the prospect of future skill loss reduces the value of high-skilled relationships, and
thus raises the zero surplus margin for high-skilled workers.15 Note however that the values
of νh(zhh) seem unreasonably high, while the values of νl(zll) seem unreasonably low.
The last column of Panel B shows that the average inﬂow rate into unemployment, as
a percentage of total labor force, remains roughly constant as γd,x rises. Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2004) stress the importance of this ﬁnding, as it agrees with empirical evidence
showing roughly constant average unemployment inﬂows over the 1970s and 1980s. In order
to reconcile a constant inﬂow rate with rising destruction rates for each skill level, a sharp
shift in skill composition must occur toward the skill level with the lower destruction rate,
which for the parameters considered in LS-II is the low level. Higher turbulence does indeed
lead to an increase in the fraction of low-skilled employed workers. For example, when γd,x
increases from 0 to 0.5, the fraction of low-skilled workers increases from 20% to 30%. The
empirical validity, however, of both the shift in skill composition and the relatively higher
job security of low-skilled workers appears questionable.16
15Our model is speciﬁed to equate the zero surplus margins of high-skilled unemployed workers and high-
skilled employed workers. Similarly, the zero surplus margin of low-skilled unemployed workers who receive
low unemployment beneﬁts is equal to that of low-skilled employed workers. Thus, the results of Panel B
also apply to rejection rates, conditional on obtaining a match, for these two groups of unemployed workers.
16Indeed, Franz (2000) reviews evidence showing large shifts toward higher skills among German workersTURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 15
3.2. Perturbed Parameterization. Now we perturb the parameterization by allowing
for a small positive probability of skill loss following endogenous separations. In particular,
let the value of γd be equal to εγd,x. The benchmark parameterization sets ε equal to zero,
while this section considers values of ε equal to 0.01, 0.03, and 0.05. If ε equals 0.05 and γd,x
is 10%, for example, then the probability of skill loss following an endogenous separation
is 0.5%. Thus, the perturbation allows turbulence to have at least a tiny eﬀect on work-
ers who choose to separate following persistent declines in their match productivity, while
maintaining the hypothesis that the eﬀects of turbulence are largely felt after unavoidable
layoﬀs.
T a b l e3r e p o r t st h er e s u l t s .A g g r e g a t eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e sa r eg i v e ni nP a n e lA .N o t e
that the column corresponding to the case of ε = 0 coincides with the results from Panel A of
Table 2. Strikingly, as ε rises from zero to 0.03, the positive relationship between turbulence
and unemployment disappears. Once ε reaches 0.05, unemployment actually decreases with
turbulence, and the result of LS is reversed. It follows that the turbulence explanation of LS
is not robust to adding a tiny probability of skill loss following an endogenous separation.
What explains this ﬁnding? Note ﬁrst that ε has little eﬀect on ulh, the fraction of
unemployed low-skilled workers who are entitled to high unemployment beneﬁts, as may be
seen in Panel B of Table 3. Similarly, Panel C indicates that νl(zlh),t h er e j e c t i o nr a t eo f
low-skilled unemployed workers receiving high beneﬁts, is nearly constant across all values
of ε.T h u s , t h e e ﬀect stressed by LS continues to be present for all of the ε values. The
diﬀerence becomes clear when one looks at the breakup probability of high-skilled workers,
νh(zhh), reported in Panel D. Once ε rises to 0.03, the relationship reported in Panel B
between 1975 and 1995.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 16
of Table 2 is reversed, and endogenous job destruction becomes a decreasing function of
turbulence. For ε equal to 0.05, νh(zhh) decreases very sharply as turbulence rises.
Of course, the quantitative importance of this result is aﬀected by the speciﬁcation of the
productivity distribution νh(z), which determines the mass of jobs having values of z near
the zero surplus margin zhh. If the jobs of high-skilled workers are so secure that zhh lies
below the support of νh(z),t h e nνh(zhh) will equal zero irrespective of any decrease in zhh
induced by higher turbulence. On the other hand, νh(zhh) will be greatly aﬀected if there
exists a large mass of jobs in the neighborhood of zhh. Resolving this issue empirically would
require data on the number of jobs close to breaking up, which seems diﬃcult to obtain.17
It should be recognized that when the LS channel operates for a particular parameteri-
zation, so that turbulence generates a strong increase in job rejection, the reduction in the
endogenous destruction rate that we highlight will also tend to be large. The LS chan-
nel requires that wage oﬀers given to formerly high-skilled workers be low relative to the
unemployment beneﬁts they receive. For this gap to be substantial, there must be a sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerence between the productivity levels of low-skilled and high-skilled jobs. For
the benchmark parameterization, productivity realizations under the high-skilled distribu-
tion have twice the mean as under the low-skilled distribution. Moreover, the probability
that a low-skilled worker upgrades to a high-skilled job is only 2.5% per period. Since the
unemployment beneﬁts of formerly high-skilled workers depend on their former productivity,
this substantial gap in mean productivity levels implies that formerly high-skilled workers
are very likely to reject jobs as low-skilled workers. But it then follows that becoming a
low-skilled worker implies a large drop in wages relative to remaining a high-skilled worker.
17T h ee v i d e n c eo nw a g e - e x p e r i e n c ep r o ﬁles, however, does provide indirect support for the benchmark
parameterization, as Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) argue.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 17
Thus, high-skilled workers will have very strong incentives to hold on to their jobs when
they face a positive probability of skill loss.
To illustrate this point, consider an alternative parameterization in which the productiv-
ity distributions are more similar. In particular, let the mean productivity level of low-skilled
workers be equal to 1.2, rather than the benchmark value 1.0. We adjust the standard de-
viation of the low-skilled distribution to maintain the equilibrium values of the endogenous
destruction and unemployment rates. Results are reported in Table 4, which recalculates Ta-
ble 3 using the new parameterization. The eﬀects observed in Table 4 are indeed dampened
relative to those of Table 3. In particular, an increase in turbulence does not raise unem-
ployment by as much when ε is equal to zero, but it also does not decrease unemployment
by as much when ε is equal to 0.05.
3.3. Separations as Quits Versus Layoﬀs. Above we showed that the positive rela-
tionship between turbulence and unemployment disappears given only a tiny probability of
skill loss following an endogenous separation. In this section we discuss the plausibility of
this perturbation of the benchmark parameterization.
LS-II defend their assumption that only exogenous separations can lead to skill loss by
arguing that endogenous separations represent worker quits that do not entail a change in
skills. As they state: “ W es e eq u i t t e r sa sp e o p l ew h oa r es e c u r ei nt h e i rs k i l l sa n di n s p i r e d
to change jobs to take advantage of evident opportunities to make better use of their current
skills (p. 462).” They interpret exogenous separations, in contrast, as layoﬀs that threaten
workers with possible loss of skills.
It is clear, however, that the quit/layoﬀ distinction is entirely arbitrary in the context of
Nash wage bargaining. Parsons (1986, p. 822) summarizes the key concepts:TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 18
“An important implication of this analysis is that no meaningful causal distinc-
tion exists between layoﬀs and quits. The separation rate is a function of the
joint distribution of productivity shocks to the ﬁrm and to the economy. Job
separation conditions are mutually agreed upon, based on complete information
on the nature of these shocks. Turnover will occur only when job mobility is
eﬃcient because it is in the interest of both parties to agree to such a contract
and information and contracting conditions are such that all desirable contracts
are attainable.”
Thus, the model as it stands provides no rationale for viewing endogenous separations as
quits, contrary to the arguments in LS-II.
Several authors have attempted to impose additional structure in order to obtain a
meaningful quit/layoﬀ distinction, while preserving eﬃcient bargaining. The basic idea is
expressed by Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977, 1145):
“... a more promising approach relies on the cause of a job or marital separation.
A quit could be said to result from an improvement in opportunities elsewhere
and a layoﬀ from a (usually unexpected) worsening in opportunities in this job
or marriage.”
In following this approach, McLaughlin (1991) adopts a particular bargaining game in
which each party can initiate separation. Quits are deﬁned as worker-initiated separations
caused by changes in the worker’s productivity outside of the ﬁrm, and layoﬀs are associated
with unfavorable changes in productivity within the ﬁrm. Mortensen (1994) and PissaridesTURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 19
(2000, ch. 4) extend the matching model to include on-the-job search, with quits tied to the
arrival of superior outside oﬀers, and layoﬀs induced by events within the ﬁrm.18 Each of
these models is successful in duplicating the empirical facts that quits are procyclical and
layoﬀs are countercyclical.
LS-II depart from the established literature in associating quits with separations caused
by within-ﬁrm productivity shifts. Moreover, their assumption leads to the untenable pre-
diction of countercyclical quits.
In the framework of LS-II and this paper, exogenous breakups can be viewed as responses
to changes in z such that the surplus becomes permanently negative.19 Viewed in this way,
there is no fundamental distinction, but only a quantitative diﬀerence, between exogenous
and endogenous separations, as both are optimal responses to a deterioration in z.T h i s
view accords with our perturbation experiment, where the probability of skill loss after an
endogenous severance is a (small) fraction of the probability of skill loss after an exogenous
severance.
In practice, most separations result from decisions made by the ﬁrm or worker, triggered
by changes in the ﬁrm’s or worker’s circumstances;20 that is, they are endogenous. Ideally,
empirical data would reveal the particulars of the changes in circumstances and whether they
are followed by skill loss. Given the unavailability of this type of data, we think that our
18An alternative class of models assumes that wage rigidities lead to ineﬃcient separations (e.g., Hashimoto
and Yu (1980), Hall and Lazear (1984)). Papers in this vein also adopt the convention that quits result from
changes outside the ﬁrm, while layoﬀs are induced by changes within the ﬁrm; see Hall (1999, pp. 1154-1156).
19For example, if the value of z would permanently shift to zero, then this would be suﬃcient for the ﬁrm
and the worker to always choose to sever the relationship.
20An exception may be an industrial accident after which it is physically impossible to continue operations.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 20
reversal of the unemployment-turbulence trade-oﬀ for a perturbation of the assumption γd =
0 is problematic for the explanation given by LS and LS-II for the European unemployment
puzzle.
4. Magnification in the Presence of Turbulence
In this section we analyze the eﬀects of a reduction in the discount factor on the unem-
ployment rate and document that the eﬀects are stronger in the presence of turbulence.
Although we focus on changes in the discount factor, one can expect turbulence to magnify
the eﬀects of changes in other parameter values that increase unemployment. We ﬁr s tg i v ea
brief overview of some related empirical and theoretical work, and then present the numerical
results.
4.1. Changes in the Discount Factor and the Unemployment Rate. Ar e d u c t i o n
in the discount factor may be interpreted as either an increase in the real interest rate or a
reduction in the rate of disembodied technological growth. During the postwar period there
have been important changes to both. In particular, real interest rates were higher in the
eighties and nineties then in the ﬁfties and sixties. Also, TFP growth has steadily declined
during the postwar period. Starting in the late nineties, both developments have been to
some extent reversed.21
Pissarides (2000) discusses the eﬀect of changes in the discount factor on the unemploy-
21The importance of movements in the real interest rate and TFP growth for European unemployment
rates is documented in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005), and Nunziata
(2003). Pissarides and Vallanti (2004) use a structural model and also ﬁnd that changes in TFP growth help
to explain changes in the unemployment rate, but they ﬁnd quantitatively stronger eﬀects for the US than
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ment rate in job matching models and shows that the eﬀect is ambiguous. The same is
true in our model. The intuition underlying this ambiguity can be easily understood by
considering the zero surplus condition for a simpliﬁed speciﬁcation with only one skill level
(γu =0 ), zero taxes, and a constant unemployment beneﬁt. The equation s(z)=0may be
expressed as
z = b − [g(z) − w], (17)
where w = ww + wf.I t i s e a s y t o s h o w t h a t (1 − ρx)γs = λ implies g(z) − w =0 ,a n d
thus z = b. N o t et h a ti f(1 − ρx)γs = λ, then the chance of getting a new draw of z
while in a relationship is equal to the chance of getting matched (and receiving a new draw
by the latter route). Thus, for z = b the worker and ﬁrm are indiﬀerent between staying
in the relationship and breaking up. Since g(b) is equal to w, a decrease in the discount
factor reduces g(b) and w by equal amounts and leaves g(b) − w,a n dt h u sz, unchanged.
Consequently, a change in β also does not aﬀect the unemployment rate.
Similarly, the eﬀect of β on the unemployment rate in the complete model is inﬂuenced
by whether the future values gi(zij) are larger or smaller than the future values from entering
the matching pools. Changes in the level of unemployment beneﬁts, taxes, and composition
of the unemployment pool introduce additional complications.
For a wide range of parameter values, including those proposed by Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2004), a decrease in the discount factor leads to higher unemployment.22 The purpose of
this section is to point out that these changes in the discount factor have a bigger eﬀect on
unemployment in the presence of turbulence.
22In particular, the last three columns of Table 2 in LS-II document that unemployment increases when
β falls in most cases considered.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 22
4.2. Changes in the Discount Factor in the Presence of Turbulence. To illustrate
the eﬀects of a change in the discount factor on the unemployment rate, we use the parameter
values in columns II and III of Table 1. These are identical to the ones used previously, except
that we set γs equal to 0.5.23 Further, we specify γd,x = γd =0 .1, i.e., both exogenous and
endogenous separations lead to a 10% probability of skill loss. The standard deviations of
the productivity distributions are increased relative to those of column I in order to obtain
an unemployment rate of 5% under the benchmark value of β =0 .99. The values in column
II are such that νh(zhh)=0for all values of β considered, so that small changes in the zero
surplus margin of high-skilled workers play no role. In column III the standard deviation of
the high-skilled productivity distribution is increased, and νh(zhh) > 0 for all values of β.
Rejection and destruction rates for high-skilled workers consequently respond to changes in
the discount rate.
Results are reported in Table 5. Panel A presents the eﬀects of a decline in β from 0.99
to 0.98, corresponding to a rise in the real (quarterly) interest rate from about 1% to about
2%, under the column II parameterization. This decline in the discount factor raises the
unemployment rate from 5% to 8%. Note that the unemployment eﬀect is due solely to
responses in the behavior of low-skilled workers, who make up only 18% of the labor force
in this example. In particular, νl(zll) rises from zero to 8.8% as β falls from 0.99 to 0.98.
Panel B gives the results under the column III parameterization. Since now the high-
skilled workers also respond to lower discount factors, the eﬀects are much larger and the
23Higher γs will raise gi(zij) relative to ww
ij +wf, since the future value of a marginal relationship derives
in part from the prospect of switching to a more favorable productivity level z>z ij. The larger gap between
gi(zij) and ww
ij + wf increases the eﬀect of a change in the discount factor on unemployment.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 23
unemployment rate increases from 5% to 23.7%.24 Because of the increase in their rejection
and destruction rates, the number of unemployed with high skills increases from 2.2% of
the labor force to 10.7% as β rises from 0.99 to 0.98. In addition, Ljungqvist and Sargent’s
turbulence eﬀect magniﬁes the increase of the unemployment rate. In particular, the stock
of low-skilled unemployed workers who receive high unemployment beneﬁts rises from 0.5%
of the total labor force to 6%. Although the probability of skill loss upon displacement is
only 10%, it plays a substantial role in the model since the rejection rates of low-skilled
workers entitled to high unemployment beneﬁt sa r es oh i g h . T h et a b l ea l s os h o w st h a ta
relatively minor decrease in the discount factor from 0.99 to 0.988 leads to an increase in
t h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ef r o m5 %t o1 0 % .
In summary, this section shows that the matching model can account for the rise in unem-
ployment through the empirically plausible mechanism of higher discount rates. Thus, the
nonrobustness of the Ljungqvist-Sargent channel should not itself be viewed as undermining
the salience of the matching model. Further, the quantitative signiﬁcance of the discount
rate channel is greatly increased when skill loss interacts with high unemployment beneﬁts,
suggesting that the presence of turbulence may play an important role even if changes in
turbulence cannot convincingly account for the increase in European unemployment.
24The decrease in the discount factor considered in Table 5 leads to an increase in the destruction rate for
each skill level and to an increase in the unemployment inﬂow rate. It is not diﬃcult, however, to construct
alternative parameterizations such that composition eﬀects leads to constant average inﬂow rates. That is,
the decrease in the discount factor would shift the distribution of jobs away from those with high destruction
rates, exerting a downward eﬀect on the average destruction rate.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 24
5. Conclusion
Despite a large amount of research, the behavior of European unemployment rates remains
diﬃcult to understand fully. In this paper we show that the promising explanation oﬀered
by Ljungqvist and Sargent, wherein increased economic turbulence leads to high job rejec-
tion rates by workers with obsolete skills, does not take adequate account of the incentives
of employed workers. If turbulence has even a tiny eﬀect on the skills of workers who en-
dogenously separate from their jobs, then job destruction rates decline dramatically with
an increase in turbulence, and unemployment falls. Thus, changes in turbulence cannot
provide an explanation for European unemployment that reconciles the incentives of both
unemployed and employed workers.25 We show, however, that the level of turbulence may
play an important role in determining the quantitative impact of other explanatory factors.
The quantitative magnitude of the examples analyzed in this paper depends crucially on
the cross-sectional distribution of the joint surplus, especially on that part of the distribution
where relationships are close to breaking up. For example, if high-skilled jobs are extremely
secure in the sense that their productivity levels lie far above the zero surplus margin, then
a moderate change in the margin will not aﬀect any high-skilled workers. This means that
only exogenous breakups matter for these workers, and an increase in turbulence would raise
the unemployment rate, just as in LS and LS-II. Similarly, for changes in the discount rate
to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the unemployment rate, there must be suﬃcient mass of either
high— or low-skilled workers close to their zero surplus margins. Using survey methods it
25Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) consider an alternative to the turbulence speciﬁcation of LS that posits
an increase in the variability of workers’ productivity levels. They analyze a mean-preserving spread of
the cross-sectional distribution of productivity levels across workers of given skills. This type of increased
variability obviously leads to an increase of both rejection and destruction rates.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 25
may be possible to discover how close employment relationships are to breaking up. The
r e s u l t si nt h i sp a p e rp o i n tt ot h ep o t e n t i a li m p o r t a n c eo ft h i sk i n do fi n f o r m a t i o n .
6. Appendix
In this Appendix we present the steady state equations for the diﬀerent unemployed and em-
ployed worker groups, as well as the equations used to calculate the unemployment beneﬁts
and the tax rate.
6.1. Worker Groups. The assumption that wage rates aﬀe c tu n e m p l o y m e n tb e n e ﬁts
makes the model quite complex, since the dependence of wage rates on outside options
creates a substantial amount of heterogeneity.T or e d u c ec o m p l e x i t yw em a k et h ef o l l o w i n g
simplifying assumptions:
1. High-skilled unemployed workers who reject a match are subject to skill loss just like
workers who separate from an employer. Therefore we do not need to distinguish
between separation and job rejection margins for high-skilled workers.
2. Low-skilled workers who receive a skill upgrade also obtain a productivity draw high
enough to ensure that they do not leave their job in the upgrade period.
3. The deﬁnition of unemployment beneﬁts, given below, merges the new entrants who
receive a draw above zll into the group of low-skilled workers who were either previ-
ously employed or had previous switches in their continuing relationships. Thus, in
calculating the beneﬁt level bl we replace the wage payments ple(z) with pll(z) for new
entrants with z ≥ zll. This simpliﬁes the computations by reducing the number of sep-
arate groups of continuing low-skilled workers, with a negligible eﬀect on the results.TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 26
New entrants who receive a draw between zle and zll do not continue in their relation-
ships unless they receive switches or upgrades in their second period of employment,
in which case they no longer receive the payment ple(z).
These assumptions leave us with four distinct unemployment groups and ﬁve distinct
employment groups. These are ule,u ll,u lh,u hh,e le,e ll,elh,e hl and ehh, where the ﬁrst subscript
indicates the skill level and the second the unemployment beneﬁts. Note that a worker can
spend only one period in the groups elh and ehl. In addition, it is necessary to keep track of
employed low-skilled workers who were once entitled to high unemployment beneﬁts (that is,
those who started employment in elh) for the computation of average productivity levels and
unemployment beneﬁts. We refer to this group as e∗
ll. These workers are identical to those in
ell for given z, but have productivity levels satisfying z>z lh,w h e r e a st h eell workers have
productivity levels that satisfy z>z ll.

















Each of the following steady state equations has the same format, with the inﬂows on the
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6.2. Unemployment Beneﬁts. Unemployment beneﬁts of a worker with skill level j in
his previous job are equal to a fraction φ of a weighted average of wages earned by workers








































el = ele + ell + e
∗
ll + elh, (34)
eh = ehl + ehh. (35)
Note that bh is simply equal to a fraction φ of the average wage of high-skilled workers.
B e c a u s ew em e r g en e we n t r a n t sw i t had r a wo fz above zll with the group of previously-
employed low-skilled workers, bl/φ i sn o te x a c t l ye q u a lt ot h ea v e r a g ew a g eo fl o w - s k i l l e d
workers but the diﬀerence with this average wage is minuscule.
6.3. Tax Base and Government Revenue. Let b zl denote the average productivity of
all low-skilled workers and b zh the average productivity of all high-skilled workers. These canTURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 29
be solved from





























The tax rate then follows from the government budget constraint:
blull + bh(ulh + uhh)=τ (elb zl + ehb zh). (38)
For the parameterizations in columns II and III in Table 1, negative values of z are
possible. For these parameterizations, we adjust the expressions for the tax base to reﬂect
the fact that taxes are zero when proﬁts are negative, that is, there are no subsidies.
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Table 1: Parameter values 
 
I:    Parameter values used to study effect of turbulence on unemployment rates; 
preferred parameter values of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) 
II & III: Parameter values used to study effects of changes in discount factor on 
unemployment rates 
 
 I  II  III 
probability of productivity change, γ
 s  0.1 0.5 0.5 
probability of upgrade, γ
 u  0.025 0.025 0.025 
probability of exogenous breakup, ρ
 x  1% 1% 1% 
retirement probability, ρ
 r  0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 
matching probability, λ   0.3 0.3 0.3 
bargaining weight, π   0.5 0.5 0.5 
replacement rate, φ   0.7 0.7 0.7 
discount factor, β   0.99 range range 
skill-loss probability for endogenous severance, γ
 D  0 0.1  0.1 
skill-loss probability for exogenous severance, γ
 D, x  range 0.1  0.1 
mean for low-skilled workers, E(zl) 1  1  1 
mean for high-skilled workers, E(zh) 2  2  2 
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Table 2: Effects of turbulence 







low skilled & 
low benefits 
 
low skilled & 
high benefits 
 




0 1.65  0.54  0.00  7.71  9.90 
0.1 1.65  0.62  0.41  7.52  10.20 
0.2 1.65  0.69  0.81  7.34  10.48 
0.3 1.65  0.75  1.18  7.16  10.74 
0.4 1.65  0.84  1.54  6.99  11.01 
0.5 1.65  0.97  1.88  6.81  11.31 
0.7 1.65  1.23  2.53  6.48  11.88 
1.0 1.65  1.62  3.42  5.98  12.67 
 
 
Panel B: Endogenous destruction rates and inflow into unemployment (%) 
γ
 d,x  low skilled  high skilled  average inflow  
0 0  16.8  2.6 
0.1 0  17.8  2.6 
0.2 0  18.8  2.6 
0.3 0  19.7  2.6 
0.4 0.2  20.7  2.6 
0.5 0.9  21.6  2.6 
0.7 2.1  23.3  2.7 
1.0 3.7  25.7  2.8 
Note: Destruction rates are conditional on receiving a switch. TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 
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Table 3: Effects of turbulence for perturbed parameterization 
Panel A: Unemployment rates (%) 
ε = γ  
d / γ
 d,x  γ
 d,x 
       0                  0.01             0.03          0.05 
0    9.9    9.9    9.9    9.9 
0.1  10.2  10.0    9.6    9.2 
0.2  10.5  10.1    9.3    8.7 
0.3  10.7  10.2    9.2    8.3 
0.4  11.0  10.3    9.1    8.1 
0.5  11.3  10.5    9.1    7.8 
0.7  11.9  10.8    9.1    7.4 
1.0  12.7  11.3    9.1    7.3 
 
 
Panel B: Low-skilled unemployed with high benefits as fraction of labor force (%) 
ε = γ  
d / γ
 d,x  γ
 d,x 
     0                  0.01             0.03          0.05 
0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
0.1 0.4  0.4  0.4  0.5 
0.2 0.8  0.8  0.9  0.9 
0.3 1.2  1.2  1.3  1.3 
0.4 1.5  1.6  1.7  1.7 
0.5 1.9  2.0  2.0  2.1 
0.7 2.5  2.6  2.7  2.7 
1.0 3.4  3.6  3.6  3.5 
 
 TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL 
  35
35
Panel C: Rejection rates of low-skilled unemployed with high benefits (%) 
ε = γ  
d / γ
 d,x  γ
 d,x 
      0                  0.01             0.03          0.05 
0 43.7  43.7  43.7  43.7 
0.1 44.3  44.4  44.7  45.0 
0.2 44.9  45.1  45.5  45.9 
0.3 45.5  45.8  46.3  46.6 
0.4 46.1  46.4  46.9  47.1 
0.5 46.7  47.0  47.4  47.3 
0.7 47.8  48.1  48.1  47.4 
1.0 49.5  49.6  48.9  47.1 
Note: Rejection rates are conditional on obtaining a match. 
 
 
Panel D: Endogenous destruction rates for high-skilled employed (%) 
ε = γ  
d / γ
 d,x  γ
 d,x 
       0                  0.01             0.03          0.05 
0 16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8 
0.1 17.8  17.2  16.0  14.8 
0.2 18.8  17.6  15.2  12.8 
0.3 19.7  17.9  14.4  10.9 
0.4  20.7  18.2  13.5    9.0 
0.5  21.6  18.5  12.7    7.2 
0.7  23.3  19.1  11.2    3.5 
1.0  25.7  19.9    9.0    0.0 
Note: Destruction rates are conditional on receiving a switch. 
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Table 4: Effects of turbulence with more similar productivity distributions 
Panel A: Unemployment rates (%) 
ε = γ  
d / γ
 d,x  γ
 d,x 
     0                  0.01             0.03          0.05 
0 9.9  9.9  9.9  9.9 
0.1 10.2  10.0  9.7  9.4 
0.2 10.4  10.1  9.6  9.1 
0.3 10.7  10.3  9.5  8.8 
0.4 10.9  10.4  9.4  8.5 
0.5 11.1  10.5  9.3  8.3 
0.7 11.6  10.7  9.3  8.0 
1.0 12.1  11.1  9.3  7.7 
 
 
Panel B: Low-skilled unemployed with high benefits as fraction of labor force (%) 
ε = γ  
d / γ
 d,x  γ
 d,x 
     0                  0.01             0.03          0.05 
0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
0.1 0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
0.2 0.7  0.7  0.8  0.8 
0.3 1.0  1.1  1.1  1.2 
0.4 1.4  1.4  1.5  1.5 
0.5 1.7  1.7  1.8  1.8 
0.7 2.2  2.3  2.4  2.4 
1.0 3.0  3.1  3.2  3.1 
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Panel C: Rejection rates of low-skilled unemployed with high benefits (%) 
ε = γ  
d / γ
 d,x  γ
 d,x 
      0                  0.01             0.03          0.05 
0 37.0  37.0  37.0  37.0 
0.1 37.4  37.5  37.7  37.9 
0.2 37.9  38.0  38.4  38.7 
0.3 38.3  38.5  38.9  39.2 
0.4 38.8  39.0  39.4  39.7 
0.5 39.2  39.5  39.8  39.9 
0.7 40.1  40.3  40.5  40.2 
1.0 41.3  41.4  41.1  40.1 
Note: Rejection rates are conditional on obtaining a match. 
 
 
Panel D: Endogenous destruction rates for high-skilled employed (%) 
ε = γ  
d / γ
 d,x  γ
 D,x 
      0                  0.01             0.03          0.05 
0 16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8 
0.1 17.7  17.2  16.2  15.2 
0.2 18.5  17.5  15.5  13.6 
0.3 19.3  17.8  14.9  12.1 
0.4 20.1  18.1  14.3  10.6 
0.5 20.8  18.4  13.6  9.1 
0.7 22.3  18.9  12.4  6.2 
1.0 24.2  19.5  10.7  2.3 








Table 5: Effects of discount factor 
Panel A: No endogenous breakups for high-skilled workers  






0.99 5.00  3.54  1.44 
0.98 8.03  3.67  2.23 
Note: The results in this table are based on the parameters under II in Table 1. 
 
Panel B: Endogenous breakups for high-skilled workers  






0.99    5.06  3.55  1.45 
0.988 10.04  3.73  2.74 
0.98 23.69 4.71  5.15 
Note: The results in this table are based on the parameters under III in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 6: Different types of workers 
 
Employment States  Unemployment States 
This text  Computer code  This text  Computer code 
le e   elotemp0 
le u   u0 
ll e   elo 
ll u   ulolo 
*
ll e   elohi 
lh u   ulohi 
lh e   elotemphi 
hh u   uhihi 
hh e   ehi    
hl e   ehitempup    
 
 